Iran’s Surging Missile ‘Shield’: The Best Justification for Attacking Iran Now

The Trump administration has given many strong reasons for President Trump’s decision to launch major combat operations against Iran, Operation Epic Fury.

The president has been clear that his primary objective is to ensure that Iran never gets a nuclear weapon. He said the military operation will give the Iranian people the opportunity to take back their country from its oppressive rulers. Ensuring that the regime’s terrorist proxies can no longer destabilize the region or the world and attack U.S. forces is another justification.

However, based on Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone attacks over the last week against almost the entire Middle East, it is clear that destroying these weapon programs is the immediate and most urgent purpose of Operation Epic Fury before they become too powerful to overcome.

Iran has fired about 300–500 missiles at Israel and hundreds of drones since the war started on Saturday. Some missiles had cluster munitions. Although almost all were shot down, some missile barrages overwhelmed Israeli defenses, leading to strikes on 5–10 civilian areas. Eleven reportedly were killed, and over 1,000 were injured. Damage and casualties from drones appear to be limited.

The number of Iranian missile and drone attacks and their accuracy against other countries in the Middle East were even more alarming. Iran reportedly fired as many as 400 ballistic missiles and 2,000 drones as of March 5 at Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. As many as 1,100 drones reportedly were fired at the UAE alone. Iran may also have attacked Oman with drones or missiles.

In addition, Iran or Hezbollah, Iran’s terrorist proxy, fired drones from Lebanon at a U.K. Royal Air Force base in Cyprus. There are reports that NATO shot down a missile fired at Turkey on March 4. Yesterday, Iran fired drones at Azerbaijan.

Most of the missiles and drones fired against Middle East countries were intercepted and caused little damage. The main targets were U.S. military facilities, embassies, and consulates. However, the large number of drones and missiles fired at the UAE also targeted hotels and landmarks, causing some fatalities.

By March 4, Iranian missile attacks were down by 86 percent, and drone attacks were down 73 percent. Missile attacks fell because Iran is running low on missiles, and the U.S. and Israeli air forces have prioritized destroying missile launchers after they fire.

Foreign Assistance to Iran’s Rapidly Growing Missile and Drone Arsenals

Israel has wanted to resume attacking Iran for several months due to signs that it was rapidly rebuilding its drone and missile arsenals that were depleted and destroyed during the 12-Day War last June. Despite a cease-fire that ended this war, negotiated by President Trump, Iran began hardening missile and nuclear facilities after the war and accelerating missile production. Iranian leaders bragged in early 2026 that they had replenished their missile arsenal. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said during a March 2 press conference that Iran was producing over 100 missiles per month.

Rubio also told reporters that Iran was building up its arsenal of drones and missiles to create a missile “shield” that, within 12 to 18 months, would put Israel “in a place of immunity where the damage they can inflict on the region would be so high that no one can do anything about their nuclear program or their nuclear ambitions.”

Hudson Institute Research Fellow Zineb Riboua expressed the same assessment this week in an excellent Substack article in which she said Iran was on track to double its missile inventory from 2,000 to 4,000 missiles by 2027 and increase it to 10,000 by 2030. Riboua believes the increase in Iran’s missile and drone arsenal was due to stepped-up massive support from China of advanced missile electronic components and rocket fuel chemicals since the 12-Day War. According to Riboua:

Israeli defense planners had tracked how Chinese components, machine tools, and technical guidance were accelerating Iranian production lines, and their projections pointed toward catastrophe: 5,000 missiles by 2027, potentially 10,000 by the end of the decade. Every warhead carried a Chinese fingerprint, from solid-fuel propellant chemistry to the precision guidance systems that turned inaccurate rockets into weapons capable of striking downtown Abu Dhabi. Beijing was not merely trading with Tehran.

There has likely also been increased Russian and North Korean support for Iran’s missile and drone program since last June. North Korea and Iran have collaborated on their missile programs for decades. Both states have also been providing weapons and ammunition to Russia for its war effort in Ukraine since 2022. North Korea also provided Russia with troops. Russia reportedly gave North Korea missile and space-launch technology in exchange for its military aid. Russia probably provided similar technology to Iran in exchange for its military support, especially Iranian attack drones that Russia has heavily used in the Ukraine War.

It is worth noting that Iran and North Korea’s space launches have been widely condemned as tests to develop multistage rockets for ICBMs. Both states have made major advances in space launches over the past 10 years, likely due to assistance from Russia and China.

The Purpose of Iran’s Missile and Drone Arsenals

The recent widespread Iranian missile and drone attacks across the Middle East were another important reason to attack Iran because they proved these weapons are offensive and that Iran planned to use them.

There has been increasing evidence over the past few years proving that Iran’s missile and drone arsenals are offensive in nature. The first indications were in 2018 and 2020 with Iranian missile attacks against Iraq, targeting ISIS, Iraqi Kurds, and a U.S. airbase.

This was also indicated by sophisticated Iranian-made missiles and drones fired by Yemen’s Houthi rebels—an Iranian proxy—against Saudi and UAE oil facilities in 2019 and 2022 and against shipping in the Red Sea after the October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorist attack. Even more disturbing was a handful of Houthi drones and missiles that hit Israeli territory in 2023 and 2024, killing one and causing minor damage. Despite the minor damage, these missiles were a significant Iranian technological achievement since they hit targets in Israel over 1,200 miles from Yemen, theoretically giving the Houthis the ability to strike most U.S. bases in the Middle East.

The strongest evidence that Iran’s missile and drone programs were offensive came on April 13, 2024, when Iran conducted its first-ever direct attack against Israel by firing 300 drones and missiles from its own soil. Iran conducted a second attack on Israel on October 1, 2024, by firing 180–200 ballistic missiles. The two Iranian attacks did very little damage, and most of the projectiles failed to reach Israel or were intercepted. Israel retaliated with limited attacks against Iranian missile defense and missile systems, and missile production facilities.

Israel learned how weak Iran’s air defenses were from its 2024 retaliatory strikes and used this knowledge to conduct devastating airstrikes against Iran during the 12-Day War. Iran retaliated by firing about 550 missiles and over 1,000 drones against Israel. Although most of these projectiles were intercepted, they did minor damage to civilian areas and military facilities. About 32 Israelis were killed, and over 3,000 were injured.

Iran’s marked shift in recent years toward the offensive use of its missile arsenal—moving well beyond any plausible defensive posture—combined with its unprecedented direct strikes on Israel in 2024 and its large-scale attacks throughout the Middle East and beyond, constitutes a powerful justification for President Trump’s decision to launch Operation Epic Fury. At the same time, Iran’s aggressive buildup of missile and drone forces to create an impenetrable “missile shield” around its advancing nuclear weapons program underscores how narrowly timed the U.S. action was—and how President Trump’s decision may ensure that Iran never gets a nuclear weapon.

* * *

Fred Fleitz previously served as National Security Council chief of staff, a CIA analyst, and a House Intelligence Committee staff member. He is the vice chair of the America First Policy Institute’s Center for American Security. He is the author of “North Korea, Nuclear Brinkmanship, and the Oval Office,” to be released by Texas A&M Press on April 7, 2026.