Trump’s Ukrainian Tightrope

To find an impossible peace between Ukraine and Russia we must understand the recent history of the war and the European and American roles in it. So, Americans should revisit some fundamental realities and questions from which to remember before going forward:

Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine in 2022?

Putin did start the war. Trump’s trolling aside, he knows that because he correctly pointed out that Putin invaded his neighbors in three of the last four administrations—but not his own, given Trump’s deterrence.

The most obvious answer why Putin did is that he thought he easily could. But why in 2022—as he had in 2008 and 2014?

Putin has nonending opportunistic desires to recombobulate what he thinks properly is and will always be Russian—whether territories to be formally absorbed or as coerced satellite states. But he moves on them only whenever he thinks the benefits outweigh the costs.

And by February 2022, he certainly felt they did.

The U.S. and NATO had lost all appearances of deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. Joe Biden had been part of the Obama-Biden administration that had naively appeased Putin for some eight years. Remember their 2009 reset by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that was based on numerous flawed and disastrous assumptions:

1. The prior Bush sanctions against Putin for invading Georgia and grabbing parts of South Ossetia were overly harsh, reflective of his supposed cowboyism evident in Iraq.
2. The Obama mystique, coupled with criticism of the prior Bush administration, would win over Putin. Remember Obama’s 2012 hot mic appeasement in Seoul, when Obama promised Putin “flexibility” (i.e., cancellation of Eastern European defense, if Putin gave Obama “space” for his “last election” (i.e., please don’t invade and embarrass Obama until after he was reelected in 2012).
3. The U.S. thought it could act unilaterally in Libya and Syria, talk of expanding NATO in Europe, and expect a humiliated Russia to keep silent and distant.
4. Once rebuffed by Putin, who took Obama’s measure, an angry and rejected U.S. would cajole, beg, and finally try to force European Union democratic values onto the Putin regime—by sanctions, by aiding Russian dissident groups, and by claiming Putin was America’s archenemy.

The flawed working theory was that an either compliant or defiant Putin could acquiesce and begin liberalizing Russia, in emulation of EU and US democracy.

All these assumptions were manifested by both Obama and Biden in a number of ways:

1. By ignoring Putin’s 2014 absorption of the Donbas and Crimea;
2. By ignoring Putin’s continual cheating on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty;
3. By contextualizing his hacking and cyber warfare that were targeting U.S. institutions and corporations (“Cut it out!” said Obama to Putin; “Certain critical infrastructure should not be attacked,” piped up Biden);
4. By suspending offensive weapons shipments to Ukraine;
5. By Biden’s announced hesitation to react to Russia’s “minor incursions” in Ukraine;
6. By coupling such appeasement with a near decade of tough talk (Putin as a “killer”) and Putin-bogeyman hysterias like “Russian collusion” and “Russian disinformation.”
7. And finally, and most importantly, by fleeing from Kabul after abandoning to the terrorist Taliban a $1 billion embassy, a $300 million airbase, and billions of dollars in military equipment.

Weakness and appeasement when coupled with loud false charges are a disastrous combination.

What Was the Biden/NATO Strategy to Deter Putin?

The most obvious answer is there was none.

After the failure of Obama covertly promoting the pro-Russian Ukrainian government in 2014 and trying to select replacement candidates that would supposedly cement the transformation of Ukraine into an EU, NATO-member, Westernized garrison state on Russia’s border, there was only an embarrassed acceptance that the Obama-Biden group had played into the hands of the aggressive Russian bear. But it soon proved it had no desire for any ensuing effort to put him back into his cave.

So, what followed with Biden after February 24, 2022, was ad hoc, on-the-fly measures that, as best we could tell, were guided by naivete:

1. Gradually and silently slide Ukraine into NATO;
2. Convince the Europeans to step up and arm Ukraine;
3. Increase weapons shipments and provide economic and intelligence aid to Ukraine to levels sufficient not to lose the war, but not to excess to win it and provoke nuclear Russia;
4. Keep feeding the war endlessly in efforts to bleed out the Russian military, weaken Putin, and perhaps provoke a “democratic revolution” in Russia;
5. Transform Ukraine and Zelensky into modern heroes by:

Overlooking entirely that Zelensky had all but canceled habeas corpus, most opposition parties and media, and postponed scheduled elections. In other words, was our once rock star becoming a “benevolent” wartime autocrat amid the apparent corruption of US and NATO aid?

Keeping mostly silent about the horrendous costs to Ukraine, where a quarter of the population has fled the country, 500,000 have been killed, wounded, missing, or captured, while the economy and infrastructure have been all but destroyed—with no end in sight.

What Were and Are America’s Strategic Interests?

We have many interests and, in no particular order, would like to work to see the following occur:

1. Stay out of a theater-wide, European war with a nuclear power.
2. End the horrific killing.
3. Seek a sustainable peace that keeps Putin inside his own borders.
4. Convince Europe to rearm, defend its own interests, and deter Russia.
5. Free up some US military investment in Europe to pivot to Asia and deter China.
6. Disrupt the Russia-China alliance.

What Should Trump Now Do?

1. Talk softer while carrying a bigger stick.
2. Leverage, if possible, a return of Putin to his February 23, 2022, borders.
3. Accept that none of the last three presidents believed Ukraine could militarily regain Donbas and Crimea and neither will be recaptured.
4. Keep Ukraine out of NATO.
5. Help NATO to ensure Ukraine is well-armed and capable of thwarting any Russian violation of the peace—in other words, a hyper-NATO ability without being in NATO.
6. Insist that all NATO countries must meet their 2 percent contributions and over the next three years up it to 5 percent.
7. Allow U.S. interests to do business in Ukraine for a variety of economic and strategic advantages.

For all of Putin’s bluster, he has paid a terrible price for marginal gains. And he would not like to repeat the invasion of an even better-armed Ukraine. Despite his braggadocio, Putin seeks an end to the war.

Russia has lost respect worldwide, especially in its military. And great powers in its neighborhood, like India and China, no longer fear Russian arms. Even without a NATO Ukraine, it is likely that both Ukraine and Europe will be better armed in the years ahead.

China may be more restive and opportunistic vis-à-vis Russia. Bottom line: Putin has lots of reasons to see the war end, especially if he understands that he cannot win it, or at least cannot win it without further political instability at home.

Trump also wants an end to the war and for lots of reasons. He knows that the U.S. is divided or rather, its parties have flipped. Conservatives want to end the war and see our military redirected to deterring China. They believe our presence abroad should not be enlarged, given the massive efforts at home needed to solve the debt, border, and cultural crises. The MAGA, don’t-tread-on-me creed is to avoid wars and entanglements unless belligerents either attack us or attack our close friends to hurt us.

In weird contrast, peacenik liberals quietly want the war to go on. They quite unrealistically believe that greater U.S. and European aid, along with Ukrainian and NATO partnership, will eventually “crack” Russia, lead to Putin’s removal, and the installation of a glorious Western, EU-Russian political and cultural democracy.

Trump must negotiate with, but not necessarily believe, Putin and proceed in Reagan’s trust-but-verify fashion. For the immediate term, he can neither politically afford to expand the war to gain negotiating leverage nor simply, in a Kabul-fashion, pull out and be blamed when Ukraine is overrun or continue the no-end-in-sight current Biden killing-field policy.

So, to avoid all three unpalatable choices, Trump wishes to move quickly and decisively to cut a deal no one will like now—but may be appreciated once the slaughter ends.

As for Ukraine, Trump has enormous leverage over it for two obvious reasons: 1) Zelensky’s resistance to Russia will collapse if U.S. military aid is even modestly cut back; 2) Zelensky is no longer the pop star of 2022 who saved Kyiv in what was naively then thought to be a short, quick victory for Ukraine.

Trump can persuade Zelensky to give up his NATO hopes and his dream of regaining lost pre-2022 territories. Instead, he can tell him to seek to reopen a free society—with or without his leadership—and to rebuild a new, somewhat smaller, more secure, and even better-armed Ukraine.

The model—unfortunately—is not a gloriously defiant and courageous Finland of winter 1939. Instead, it is—realistically—an exhausted, proud, and realistic Finland of March 1940, when it finally accepted the reality of a Russian impending victory, negotiated, surrendered disputed territory, was often criticized but still preserved its autonomy, balanced East and West, finally gained international respect, armed to the teeth, and deterred Russia from entering the Finnish quagmire again.

Trump can make the argument that Russian détente with the U.S. and Europe is in Russia’s interests. The West does not have any territorial ambitions in Russia—unlike Moscow’s current partner of convenience, China, which most surely does. That is Beijing’s attitude toward any territorially large, naturally rich neighbor (like Australia) that is underpopulated. Putin will likely stay in power if the war ends now; he will see real threats to his regime if it continues for another three years.

Trump can let Europe decide whether it wants a beefed-up NATO, under strong U.S. leadership and engagement, in which all the parties invest 2 percent of their GDP in defense now and 5 percent in three years.

Or he can let Europe prefer to keep conning and lollygagging—sorta, kinda arming, sorta, kinda not arming. And thus, Europe will ensure that the U.S. becomes a nominal 2-percent member but forgoes leading an alliance of what Obama once called deadbeat “free riders.” Their choice, not ours.

In sum, Trump can end the war to no one’s satisfaction, or let Europe and Zelensky negotiate and see the war continue endlessly to no one’s satisfaction. Given geographical realities, the U.S. can live without a settlement, but eventually, all the other parties cannot.

For all the media screaming and left-wing accusations, Trump’s recent antics have at least accomplished the following: the NATO nations, Ukraine, and Russia are all confused about what Trump is saying, and so now all the more want him to stop the war.